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Abstract 
The phase 1 of the SPIRAL2 facility, the extension 
project of the GANIL laboratory, is under construction in 
Caen, France. The accelerator is based on a linear 
solution, mainly composed of a normal conducting RFQ 
and a superconducting linac.  
One of its specificities is to be designed to accelerate 
high power deuteron and heavy ion beams from 40 to 
200kW, and medium intensity heavy ion beams as well to 
a few kW. A Machine Protection System has been studied 
to control and protect the accelerator from thermal 
damages for a very large range of beam intensities and 
powers.  
This paper presents the technical solutions chosen for 
this system which is based on two technical subsystems: 
one dedicated to thermal protection which requires a first 
PLC associated with a fast electronic system and a second 
dedicated to enlarged protection which is based on a 
safety products. 
INTRODUCTION 
The SPIRAL2 facility under construction at Ganil will 
extend the possibilities for experimental nuclear physics 
towards more exotic beams [1]. 
After being pre accelerated by a RFQ, the primary 
stable beams (deuterons, protons, light and heavy ions) 
accelerated by the Linac will range from a few 10 ?A to 5 
mA in intensities, and from 0,75 A.MeV up to 
14,5A.MeV for heavy ions, 20 A.MeV for deuterons and 
33 MeV for protons in energies. Moreover, beam time 
structure may also vary from continuous beams (88 MHz) 
to chopped beams (1Hz to 1kHz) and single bunch mode 
beams. 
The Machine Protection System ?2? has thus to be 
designed to monitor a very large beam power range and 
various types of beam time structures. 
MAIN FUNCTIONS OF THE MACHINE 
PROTECTION SYSTEM 
The main functions of the SPIRAL2 Machine 
Protection System (MPS) are the followings: 
? Protect the beam tubes and insertion devices (slits, 
faraday cups, targets,…) from beam thermal 
damages,  
? Control the operating range of the facility, 
? Control the accelerator device activation due to beam 
losses (beam losses limited to 1W/m for D+ beams),  
? Ensure a reinforced protection of the beam dumps 
and targets, which all have their own protection 
system. 
? Ensure a safety class protection of the safety class 
fast vacuum valves. 
RESPONSE TIMES 
Thermal calculations have been performed in order to: 
? Evaluate the response time necessary in case of 
instantaneous high beam losses, 
? Calculate the thresholds under which permanent 
beam losses are acceptable. 
Response Times for the Thermal Protection  
The response times are calculated according to the 
various material temperature increases due to beam 
losses. Furthermore, the operation temperatures must 
remain much below the fusion temperature, in order not 
to degrade the material characteristics (usually, the 
thermal stress limit is considered [3]). 
A maximum of 50?s response time is calculated for 
aluminum chambers, while a maximum of 35?s response 
time is obtained for stainless steel chambers, for which a 
limit operation temperature of 1000°C is considered [4]. 
Response Times for the Reinforced Protection of 
Beam Dumps and Targets 
The response time is determined by the thermal 
resistance of the target that receives the ion beams. The 
MPS must cut the beam in time to preserve the 
experiment target in case of dysfunction of the thermal 
MPS controls. This time is estimated at about few ms 
taking into account a safety margin. Several cases have 
been considered: 
? a stop of the rotation of the target, 
? an error in sending the beam intensity higher than the 
capacity of the target. In this case the control system 
has to cut the beam intensity within the specified 
time. 
Response Time for the Safety Class Fast Vacuum 
Valve Protection 
The response time is determined by the time of moving 
the valve when the system is triggered. This time depends 
on the type and the size of the valve. Time to set in 
motion the smaller valve (DN40) is 2 ms and the closing 
time is 8 ms. So the reaction time should not exceed 2 ms. 
Response Times to Cut the Beam 
The two actuators which cut the beam are the chopper 
for thermal fast protection cuts and the RFQ for the safety 
class beam cut. The RFQ was chosen for the safety class 
beam cut because it is simpler and safer than the chopper.  
ARCHITECTURE OF THE MACHINE 
PROTECTION SYSTEM 
The SPIRAL2 Machine Protection System is based on 
three technical subsystems, as presented in Fig. 1: 
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Personnel Safety and Machine Protection
? One dedicated to thermal protection, which requires 
a fast electronic protection system (a few tens of ?s) 
and a PLC (10 ms range). 
? One dedicated to enlarged protection, based on 
robust technologies consisting of a PLC associated 
with a redundant hard wired system. It controls the 
operation domain of the facility from the safety point 
of view for losses, beam intensities and the integrity 
of the various beam dumps and targets, among which 
actinide targets.  
? One dedicated to protect the safety class fast vacuum 
valves of the facility. It’s a specific device because 
this system is safety classed. The safety class fast 
vacuum system has a central protection system from 
the safety point of view. 
 
Thermal Protection System 
The thermal protection system is constituted of three 
main components: 
1) A PLC (with 1300 Inputs/Outputs) which: 
? Coordinates the machine mode changes, 
? Verifies the MPS hardware configuration through 
the Run Permit System (RPS). The Run Permit 
System enables to define in a secure way the 
Machine Mode. One Machine Mode corresponds to 
the choice of one beam type, one beam path along 
the accelerator and one beam power. These 
parameters are defined through a secure system 
based on hard wired keys [5], 
? Activates or inhibits the monitoring equipments, 
? Prevents from potential beam losses with slow beam 
cuts, by controlling all ancillary systems like 
cryogenics, vacuum, etc… 
? Protects insertion devices from beam damages by 
controlling slow beam stops. 
2) A fast electronic protection system which: 
? Protects the beam chambers from direct beam 
damages, 
? Activates a fast beam cut through the use of the low 
energy beam line slow chopper.  
It receives the alarms from all the beam diagnostics, 
like loss rings and sleets, beam loss monitors, beam 
profile monitors, intensity measurements with ACCT and 
DCCT, beam position monitors, time of flight monitors 
for energy measurements [6]. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Functional Schem of the SPIRAL2 Machine Protection System, with its three sub-systems:  
Thermal Protection, Enlarged Protection, Classified protection for fast vacuum valves. 
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 It sends then an order of beam cut to the Beam Time 
Structure Control Electronic, which commands the slow 
chopper, and to the RFQ, as shown in Fig. 2. 
3) The control system [7] which: 
? Automatically checks the machine set of parameters 
and settings,  in coherence and respect with the RPS, 
? Allows specific users for managing the various 
detection thresholds, 
? Implements a user interface to increase the beam 
power in a coherent way with the MPS, keeping 
track of progressive steps, 
? Provides an operator interface for surveying beam 
losses and beam throughput, also displaying alarms 
such as beam cuts. 
? Displays some general synoptic for interlocks and 
the beam structure pulse representation. 
Enlarged Protection System 
This system is a simple and secured one, based on the 
association of a PLC with a hard wired system. This 
system relies on the following diagnostics based sub-
systems: 
? The monitoring of radiation produced by beam 
losses, 
? The operating range control of the facility, 
? The beam dump and target integrity controlling set.  
It receives alarms from beam losses monitors, beam 
intensity and energy diagnostics, beam dump and targets 
control parameters. Therefore, it activates the beam cut 
through commands sent to safe and slow beam stops in 
the low energy beam line in association with a temporary 
RF stop on the RFQ. It based on a redundant hard wired 
system as show in Fig 2. 
Classified Protection System for the Safety Class 
Fast Valve Protection 
The classified protection system is based on the 
association of a PLC with two redundant hard wired 
systems. The first one is a part of the Enlarged system, 
and the redundant part is an electronic device based on a 
7400 series chips. 
To respect the requirements of IEC 61508 standard, a 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) was made to 
eliminate dangerous failures. The single failure criterion 
was selected as reliability criterion. 
BEAM DIAGNOSTIC ALARM 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
Beam diagnostics are distributed along the accelerator, 
and most of them are non interceptive, in order to control 
continuously beam parameters and beam losses [6]. 
Alarm Management System 
The beam diagnostic alarm management system is 
based on a fast electronic card, which receives alarms 
from the various diagnostics. These alarms are then 
gathered on an electronic summation card. 
Threshold and Alarm Management 
The thresholds for beam loss detection have to be 
recalculated for each beam, due to the specificity of 
SPIRAL2, which accelerates a large range of beams, with 
various intensities and energies. The general control 
system calculates these thresholds. 
CONCLUSION 
The SPIRAL2 MPS is currently under design. PLCs 
and fast electronic cards are under design, for a 
realization scheduled in 2014. The technical complexity 
of the SPIRAL2 system is directly linked to the large 
variety of accelerated beams, in terms of intensities 
(several orders of magnitude) and energies, and in terms 
of beam time structure. In addition, one system is 
classified for safety aspects of the facility which implies a 
much heavier work load due to quality constraints 
associated to safety class equipment.  
The MPS will have to be in operation for the second 
semester of 2014, to start the commissioning of the 
facility. 
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Figure 2: Redundant hard wired system. 
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